The Ontogenesis of Social Representations: A Dialectic Perspective

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The leitmotif of Duveen’s work has been the process through which children assimilate the beliefs of their communities and thus acquire their social identity, which in turn enables them to become social actors. Duveen’s research focused such process in its interconnection with individual activities; his originality as a researcher lies in elucidating this dialectical process. This paper deals with some of Duveen’s works from the perspective of the relation between Social Representations theory and Development Psychology. The article discusses, on one hand, Duveen’s sympathetic and critical view of Piaget’s work; on the other, his interpretation of Vygotsky’s influence on the study of social representations ontogenesis; moreover the paper shows how has Duveen established the conditions for SR to be accepted by developmental psychologists; and finally, there is a review of some of his empirical studies which link psychological development to social identity, as regards the issue of individuation in social psychology.

The work of Gerard Duveen has been the main driving force of the intellectual exchange between the Theory of Social Representations (TSR) and Developmental Psychology (DP), insofar as it embraces a genetic perspective to study the appropriation of social representations (SR). The leitmotif of Duveen’s work has been the process through which children assimilate the beliefs of their communities and thus acquire their social identity, which in turn enables them to become social actors. When dealing with the ontogenesis of SR, Duveen has emphasized their interconnection with individual activities; his originality as a researcher lies in the way he elucidates this dialectical process. Such distinctive approach
has positioned him as an unmistakable figure among social psychologists. “If the problem for developmentalists is, then, to understand how children develop as social actors, many times social psychologists also forget, and to their own detriment, that every social actor has a developmental history whose influence cannot be denied” (Duveen, 1994a).

This article discusses, firstly, Duveen’s sympathetic and, at the same time, critical view of Piaget’s work regarding the relation between individual knowledge and society; secondly, his interpretation of Vygotsky’s work, which acknowledges his contribution to the TSR while questioning some aspects of his concept of culture; thirdly, Duveen’s approach for establishing the conditions for SR to be accepted by developmental psychologists; and finally, the significance of some of his empirical studies which link psychological development to social identity, in the context of the issue of individuation in social psychology.

Before proceeding, it should be clear that I am going to examine some aspects of Gerard Duveen’s thinking with the audacity of someone who has only partial knowledge of his intellectual career path and empirical inquiries as well as the vicissitudes of his theoretical and meta-theoretical exploration of social representations. I must admit that I am not acquainted with all of his writings, and I have not had the good fortune to know him in person. My interpretation is that of a child development psychologist with a focus on social knowledge and a constructivist background. I have found inspiration in Duveen’s texts to change the research tradition I belong to. Based on his work, I have tried to open up a conversation with the social sciences and with SR psychology, having questions of my own, and from a perspective somewhat external to the tradition of social psychology. That is why my approach might shed a different light onto such a rich and influential work.

THE INTERPRETATION OF PIAGET’S WORK

In Duveen’s opinion, the study of the ontogenesis of SR had to make a detour and engage in a discussion with Piaget and Vygotsky, since they had established the original assumptions for the reconstruction of psychological development. When relating DP to the TSR, he favored genetic epistemology and psychology, whose approaches he applied creatively in his theoretical production and empirical studies. But, which Piaget did Duveen read? There is no doubt that it was not the scholar of the stages of intelligence, nor was it the
theorist of the lonely individual’s intellectual development, as interpreted by mainstream
developmental psychology and by some social psychologists (Emler and Dickinson, 1993;
Emler, Ohana and Dickinson, 1990/2003) too loyal to Durkheim’s thinking. Nor did his
interpretation belong with an observer that is only interested in getting the author’s body of
knowledge, but with an auctor, intended to question ideas from the standpoint of his own
problems, “in order to obtain rules relevant to the construction of his own object” (Bourdieu,

has stressed the constructivist stand common to social psychology and Piaget’s thinking,
which resembles the processes responsible for the emergence of SR. In broad terms,
objectification and anchoring processes cannot be separated when it comes to shape social
meanings and assimilate a specific object by including it in a group’s network of meanings.
What the world is “to us”, or the object, is not a reflection of the outside world, but the result
of a construction made by the social group. But not only is the object constructed; the same
operations also constitute the subject, as they shape the social and individual identity,
fundamental in Duveen’s work. Opposed to both apriorism and empirism, he reminds us that
“the same operation, which constructs an object in this way is also constitutive of the subject
(the correlative construction of subject and object in the dialectics of knowledge was also a
characteristic feature of Jean Piaget’s genetic psychology and Lucien Goldmann’s genetic

In addition, he has emphasized the substantive nature of the theory of dialectics
involving the stability and the transformation of SR, where stability is just temporary, as
Moscovici had formulated it. But unlike Piaget’s more universalist approach to development,
Duveen, just as Moscovici, has stressed that the change in SR results from the contingencies
in group life situations. Furthermore, in his effort to regain the genesis-and-structure
dynamics in social interaction for the TSR, Duveen has suggested that it should be detached
from the commitment to the biological self-organization that was also part of Piaget’s
epistemological project (Duveen, 2000b).

From a methodological standpoint, Duveen has dealt with the convergence of DP and
TSR—following Moscovici— in terms of the genetic reconstruction that constitutes a basic
research procedure for any psychological phenomenon under study (Duveen, 1994a; 2001;
1997). However, each discipline has a different focus of interest: the sociogenesis of SR in social communication, in one case, and the transformations of children’s ideas and psychological functions in ontogenesis, in the other. Hence Duveen’s concern with linking the field of development to his fundamental question: to what extent does the child’s mental development contribute to the appropriation of SR? (Duveen, 1994a)

To answer this question, Duveen goes back to Piaget’s view of cognitive constructions, particularly resorting to *Children’s Moral Judgment* (1932) and *Sociological Studies* (1995) to stress the inseparability of individual activity and social practices. He emphasizes the connection between moral heteronomy and the exercise of hegemonic authority, as well as between autonomy and social cooperation practices. Duveen thereby transfers Piaget’s theory of children’s active intellectual production in the context of symmetrical relationships with their peers to the ontogenesis of SR. He applies this theory systematically in his studies (Leman and Duveen, 1996; 1999).

Along the same line, he has explained his stance to social psychologists such as Emler and Dickinson (1993); Emler, Ohana and Dickinson, (1993), who criticized constructivism. Those authors were right in questioning the idea that isolated subjects produce social knowledge identically or that they spontaneously elaborate purely cognitive problems without considering the “solutions” already available in society. However, Duveen (1994a; 1997) considered this account to be a distortion of Piagetian theory in as much as it neglects the interaction between individual construction and social practices that is present in Piaget’s texts. Besides, he draws attention to the narrowing of the TSR itself in that it acknowledges children’s participation in SR communication as their only “activity”, eliminating individual construction and disregarding children’s intellectual autonomy, even when it is related to a social practice.

It is true that, for a long period, Piaget did not study the social nature of knowledge, which became “an unstable element in his work” (Duveen, 1994a, page 270). Moreover, Piaget did not specify how social interactions make the resolution of cognitive conflicts possible, or how they constrain it; and in his studies with a functional approach, equilibration processes worked just inside the cognitive system, excluding interactions with other systems (Psaltis and Duveen, 2006). Unfortunately, Duveen – as most psychologists of knowledge - does not mention Piaget’s *Psychogenesis and History of Science* (1983), a book that explicitly
acknowledges SR and ideology, as a web of meanings within which objects of knowledge are located, in such a way that the functioning of the individual’s cognitive system and scientific activity in general are conditioned and modulated by the social system (García, 2001).

Finally, Duveen’s characterization of Piaget as an ethnographer of human development, who always paid attention to the dialectics between the empirical material and the categories of interpretation by turning clinical interviews into “dense” descriptions, was key for his vigorous defense of qualitative logic against the experimentalism of many of Piaget’s critics (2000a). Research using the clinical method is ethnographic because the interviewer tries to interpret how a child understands a situation. In a similar vein, Duveen’s impeccable defense of the ethnographic method stands out: For its appropriateness for describing the ways in which gender identities are embodied in beliefs and practices associated with the school (Duveen and Lloyd, 1993); for enlightening the ontogenesis of gender SR, allowing different thinking styles in the constitution of identity, influenced by cognitive development, to come into view for the researcher (Wagner, Duveen et al., 1999); for spelling out the varied expressions of boys’ and girls’ gender identities, in contrast to the homogeneous way most DP considers those categories (Wagner, Duveen, et al., 1999).

SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS AND VYGOTSKY’S PSYCHOLOGY

In order to study the ontogenesis of SR, Duveen also had to engage in a discussion with Vygotsky, whose theories on the social and cultural origin of superior psychological phenomena, as well as their semiotic nature, are very attractive for social psychologists. In particular, Duveen was interested in Vygotsky’s hypothesis of internalization as an active process by which individuals appropriate cultural instruments and constitute their subjectivity, through a dynamics of interpersonal relationships presented mainly in dyadic terms. The most paradigmatic example of this model is the Zone of Proximal Development, where an apprentice acquires cultural knowledge through social participation, guided by an expert.

In Vygotsky’s work, the term “culture” is used as an equivalent to “concepts or word meanings (rather than cultural practices) existing in that culture” (Van der Veer, R., 1996 page 260). While this psychological approach is valuable for explaining how individuals master the semiotically mediated aspects of their cultural heritage and acquire a relative
cognitive authority, it is somewhat oversimplified, and creates the impression that the diversity of meanings related to institutional or group life are not relevant for the interpretation of culture or for the constitution of subjectivity. Wertsch (1993) was one of the cultural psychologists that stressed the weak role that the Vygotsky’s analysis gave to historic and institutional aspects. By contrast, Wertsch incorporated the “voices” of others, in Bakthin’s sense, to place sign systems within their production contexts.

Duveen also pointed to the simplicity and homogeneity that washed out Vygotsky’s concept of culture, but emphasized, in addition, a deficiency barely noticed by other psychologists: In so far as culture appears as a group of signs available ready to be appropriated, “there is no significant diversity of values within this image of culture” (Duveen, 1997, page 82). If a culture doesn’t contain the sense adopted by signs when expressing a group’s values, or the differences in values and perspectives, the relations of power and the conflicts that structure social phenomena stay out of sight. Maybe he found it strange that a Marxist like Vygotsky did not attach importance in his psychology to the heterogeneity of representations, which reflects the uneven distribution of power. One of the consequences of that version of culture was that the psychological subject was seen as constituted purely in the internalization of semiotic instruments, and therefore as not influenced by the vicissitudes of social life. Likewise, Duveen questioned the neo-Vygotskian theory of guided participation (Rogoff, 1990; Duveen, 1997) which does not provide room for social conflict, tension and resistance (Duveen, 1998).

Similarly, Duveen (1997; 1994a) realized that the hypothesis of an internalization process that is accomplished through the child’s dyadic interaction with an expert was not enough to fulfil the objective of understanding the constitution of social identity. The latter is produced by the SR children encounter while taking part in a set of social practices that go beyond the relationships proposed by Vygotsky. For example, starting school life entails coming into contact with SR such as those of gender (Lloyd and Duveen, 1992), which sometimes appear in dyadic relationships, but on other occasions emerge in broader social interactions. “Yet gender is also a more diffuse phenomenon which surrounds the child through a variety of semiotic media: the toys which children play with carry gender markings; the social roles articulated in comics, picture book and television programmes are also marked by gender ….” (Duveen, 1997, page 83).
Lastly, it is worth mentioning that in some of his texts (1998; 1994a; 1997), Duveen has echoed Moscovici’s reservations about the concept of internalization formulated by Vygotsky for being “too good to be true” (Moscovici, 1990, page 179). That is, this concept suggests an unmediated relation between social practices and intrapsychological life that is too straightforward. Empirical research on gender identity seems to show, on the contrary, that the passage from the social to the individual sphere is even more dialectic that in Vygotsky’s internalization due to the interactions that come into play. It is necessary to appeal to the mediation of social identity and how it is assumed by each child to understand the differences in the decisions they make when choosing a cultural object, such as a toy. The intervention of gender identity (Duveen, 1993) complicates and diversifies the genesis of subjectivity. In a broader sense, the development of children’s social identity can favor learning in the Zone of Proximal Development and, occasionally, can become a source of conflict among representations (Duveen, 1998).

THE IMPACT ON DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY

One might say that Duveen has been the social psychologist who has resorted to DP the most. He has interpreted DP in terms of a dynamic articulation between individual elaboration and social interactions, as well as between cultural transmission and its active appropriation, and has applied it to the study of the ontogenesis of SR. At the same time, his ideas about SR could have a significant impact on the DP of social knowledge. This discipline would benefit from Duveen’s effort to bring to light the distinctiveness of the knowledge of SR; the significance of cognitive polyphasia in development; the rejection of a one-and-only logic in social thinking; and the articulation between social identity and the epistemic subject.

To begin with, classical research about social notions has been guided by the theory of information processing and, above all, by a “literal” version of Piaget’s tradition. This approach studied social knowledge as a progressive unfolding of intellectual operations (Duveen and De Rosa, 1992; Kolhberg, 1984; Furth, 1980) and of increasingly “advanced” child conceptualizations, making the social world merely an object, external to the subjects under study. A series of convincing studies show, within this theoretical framework, how children make progress in the levels of knowledge, in their cognitive decentering, or in their
conceptual differentiation and integration of historical, political or economic knowledge (Berti and Bombi, 1988; Castorina, 2005).

However, those empirical inquiries, among other difficulties, are unable to account for the endurance of certain ideas that resist change and survive in individual history during the development of strictly cognitive concepts and representations, and even during formal teaching and learning processes. On the one hand, psychologists of knowledge themselves have identified the constant “personalization” in child characterizations –7 to 70 years-old!- of political authority and historical phenomena as well as the belief that their country has always existed and that it is practically eternal (Castorina, 2005; Carretero and Kriger, 2006). Data point to the existence of characteristics that seem unyielding to the evolution of conceptual systems, or that may arise from difficulties in abstraction or in the differentiation and integration of ideas. On the other hand, research on SR (Emler, Ohana and Moscovici, 1987), on children’s beliefs about institutional roles, and on ideas about wages in the different professions or genders (Duveen, 1989), have shown that children’s answers do not vary significantly by age, but rather by the social groups they belong to.

Duveen claimed that these notions cannot be just ordered in a lineal sequence from “prelogical” to “logical” thinking, or from “egocentricity” to “selflessness”. What follows from this is his contraposition between strictly structural knowledge, oriented by its starting point in science or adult common sense, and the knowledge of SR built in the context of communication with other people, and which is intrinsically evaluative. This is precisely why values cannot be ordered with the logical sequence of cognitive development studies; in fact, children’s appropriation of those aspects of SR precedes the very development of concepts or cognitive structures, so the child as an individual constructor of social knowledge is clearly different from the child who is a social actor (Duveen and De Rosa, 1992).

Duveen’s ideas challenge DP to take into account cognitive polyphasia, a concept formulated by Moscovici (1961) and studied by his disciples (Wagner, Duveen and et al., 1997; Duveen, 2006). Yet, most social psychologists use this category to add tension and conflict between scientific knowledge and common sense knowledge, rarely acknowledging the individual construction of concepts. Even in some of Moscovici’s texts (2001), notions about the natural or social world studied by DP are interpreted as signs of the existence of SR
appropriated by subjects. Furthermore, he agrees with Chomsky in considering that knowledge of intuitive physics, biology or economy is immediate and can be acquired without too many interactions or too much effort.

The results of empirical studies in DP, however, do not show the immediacy or lack of effort Chomsky mentions: The notions of conservation of physical quantities (Piaget, 1971b), those referring to school and political authority (Lenzi & Castorina, 2000), some economic (Berti & Bombi, 1988; Faigenbaum, 2000) and moral ideas (Barreiro, 2008; Turiel, 1983), as well as children’s understanding of historical time (Carretero, 2009), they all require a prolonged effort of intellectual elaboration, as well as the reorganization of the web of ideas. In turn, Duveen explicitly acknowledges (Duveen and De Rosa, 1992; Duveen 1994a) the polyphasia between the construction of ideas that are not strictly collective and do not result purely from the appropriation of social beliefs, and those which are social in nature. “The coexistence of these two ways of thinking can be seen in all the “exceptions” to logical thinking reported in adulthood reported empirical research…” (Duveen and De Rosa, 1992, page 105).

In this respect, Duveen (2000a) wonders why Piaget himself was not able to think in these terms, considering that he acknowledges the role of social transmission in his theory of the ways in which adult authority restricts children’s constructive activity. In my opinion, his “monophasia” results from the kind of epistemological problems that prevailed in his work: How the genesis of math and logic in children provides evidence to take sides in the debate between apriorism, Platonism and empirism in the constitution of science.

The third lesson Duveen (1998) taught DP was to render the rejection of SR meaningless since such exclusion would imply that children’s thinking is illogical. In other words, he critically pointed to the inflexible contraposition between the path of knowledge towards rationality and the irrational nature of every alternative process underlying in cognitive and psychogenetic DP. The intellectual project of modernity, in this way, has long assumed the uniformity of the development of thinking and a transcendental criterion that adjudicates other ways of thinking.

Duveen argued instead that the elaboration of the meanings that structure social life involves a peculiar kind of articulation by drawing an analogy with the mechanisms of condensation and displacement put forward by Freud. According to this, symbols can
represent a lattice of meanings whose elements can be logically contradictory, giving rise to a logic that may be different from the one that governs the knowledge of the world. In this perspective, SR have a “figurative” core around which various meanings merge, which are not strictly consistent but are all part of a particular lattice resulting from the combination of meanings. To a certain extent, there are similarities with Levi-Bruhl’s concept of participation and with the first Piaget’s transductive thinking that connected particulars to particulars without resorting to universality or logical necessity. The logic articulation of conceptual representations in social discourse is not in opposition to the absence of logic in SR but to another kind of meaning articulations, as Grize has shown (1986).

Last, the acquisition of social identity in children, maybe Duveen’s most original formulation in social psychology, demands from DP a diversification of the psychological subject. In different texts (Duveen and Lloyd 1990/2003; Duveen, 1993; Wagner, Duveen et al., 1999) it has been argued that social identities are the structures that differentiate groups of individuals. Specifically, gender SR offer a range of possible identities, preparing individuals to take different stands, as a boy or girl, and thus find their way around in the social world. In addition, his work questions the limits of the naturalized subject of computational psychology and of the subject belonging to a homogeneous culture of socio-historical psychology, by means of appealing to the conflicts among representations, with their associated identities, in some groups of children. This opens up a dimension of analysis that places the subject of development in the context of social heterogeneity and turns it into a genuine social actor.

Psychologists of social knowledge that study the epistemic subject should place the interaction with objects within certain specific contexts, acknowledging the restrictions in individual construction derived from the social identity. Even the analysis of the difficulties detected in students to achieve a conceptual change can no longer be limited to pragmatic aspects or to the confirmatory bias of their previous hypotheses. It is necessary to appeal to the resistances originated in students’ social identities, loaded with values and emotions, to change their social beliefs. The psychologists from the socio-historical school, as it has already been said, would benefit from considering intrapsychological life not just in terms of a “cultural” subject, but also in terms of a social actor shaped by diversity and contrasts.

THE APPROACH TO INDIVIDUATION

Ever since the publication of Durkheim’s work, the category of collective representation made it possible to construe knowledge as a social product. However, this characterization inevitably led to the problem of individuation: How is it possible that, given the fact that collective representations are common to all individuals in a society, those individuals still acquire their own representations? Such matter can be posed not only in terms of the schools of sociology that are indebted to Durkheim’s thinking, but also in terms of any psychology that affirms the social nature of knowledge and other psychological phenomena (Kozulin (1994). Thus, a central goal for Vygotsky and his disciples was to uncover the process by which cultural instruments transmitted in social interaction become intrasubjective phenomena, inherent to each individual. For their part, Duveen and his colleagues (1994, 1997, 1998; Leman & Duveen, 1996; 1999; Psaltis and Duveen, 2006) studied the individuation of SR in depth when dealing with the relations between the TSR and DP. This perspective, together with his theory of the relation between SR and social identity, enabled him to make progress on aspects that had not been tackled by the TSR, based on the integration of the ontogenesis, sociogenesis and microgenesis of SR (Duveen and Lloyds, 1990/ 2003).

By reconstructing the ontogenesis, it was possible to characterize the process by which children and adults, as social actors in a thinking society, access their community’s SR, which “[…] are psychologically activated in the individuals in the form of social identities […]” (Duveen and Lloyd, 1990/2003, page 36). Specifically, studies about the formation of gender identity in children showed that the internalization of this socio-historical construction allows them to take part in the social order as independent actors. At the microgenetic level, individuals interact, debate and resolve conflicts in the context of social activities by resorting to SR and, in some cases, constructing them, being “[…] a real engine for the genetic transformations of social representations” (Duveen and Lloyd, 1990/ 2003, page 38). The other levels in the genesis of SR are derived from these “engines” to a large extent.

When a child goes through the appropriation of a social identity linked to her group’s SR, she performs an individual activity. Here one can appreciate the importance of cognitive elaborations in development, especially in the context of social interactions among peers.
Although the beliefs that emerge in children’s development are socio-cultural, in the process of their appropriation, or even during their microgenetic construction, “[…] adopting the perspective of social representations does not mean abandoning a notion of cognitive development (…..) This may make us see cognitive development as a moment of relative autonomy (…..), but it also serves to reminds us that between “thinking society” and the emergence of children as social actors there is a process construction wich need to be addressed ” (Duveen, 1997, page 78). Duveen combines the appropriation of SR and cognitive development dynamically: From a social psychologist’s perspective, the concept of individuation makes reference to the process of construction that each child goes through while internalizing SR.

Thus, when studying conversations of groups of children about “neutral” perception tasks, Leman and Duveen (1996) pointed out that inexperienced boys find it difficult to accept experienced girls’ arguments. Later, Leman and Duveen (1999) characterized the influence of social interactions based on gender identity on children’s moral judgments concerning problematic situations. In particular, they described the interplay between status authority, as resulting from gender SR, and epistemic authority, as resulting from the rationality of arguments based on reciprocity and mutual respect. According to their results, when epistemic authority is put forward by a girl with autonomous thinking before a heteronymous boy, it is more difficult for the latter to agree with her arguments than in cases where participants are of the same gender or epistemic authority is represented by a boy against a girl. The authors stress that the influence of SR on the resolution of moral problems involves aspects of boys and girls’ cognitive development.

Recently, Zittoun, Duveen, Gillespie, Ivinson & Psaltis (2003) reinterpreted the studies about peer interactions regarding moral judgment, identifying the styles of arguments –conceived as symbolic resources– used by boys in view of the problem proposed by the researcher. Thus, when girls resort to reciprocity arguments in reply to heteronomy arguments put forward by boys, who gain support from their gender status, SR provide orientation so that the subjects can interpret the situation. SR provide them with “[…] a code for managing the conduct of their interactions with other children” (Zittoun, Duveen, et al., 2007, p. 424). SR do not operate within an individual who has to assume a course of action on her own, but in
microgenetic situations of interaction between peers: “…such conducts could be described as a form of situational positioning at the interpersonal level” (p. 424).

The same authors show us that situations of negotiations in problem resolution contexts involve a range of constraints, understood as conditions that both limit and enable. On the one hand, the argumentative styles that individuals resort to are limited by gender SR, which strongly determine what can be thought about the problems faced; on the other hand, each interlocutor’s competence enables her to adopt an independent point of view among other argumentative styles that are symbolic resources per se. Once more, Duveen opens up a space for cognitive development which does not exclude the SR that constrain social interactions aimed at the joint resolution of problems.

In their last research, Psaltis and Duveen (2006) resumed the studies about socio-cognitive conflict from the Socio-Cognitive School of Geneva, aimed at promoting individual progress, and they re-examined them through the analysis of micro conversations. This approach allows to identify forms of interaction that promote or block the reorganizations of the notion of substance in boys and girls at different levels of progress in their argumentation. In this sense, Duveen goes back to Piaget’s distinction between constriction and cooperation, wondering what kind of conversation facilitates symmetrical relationships between the agents. Analyzing data strictly and neatly, they showed that not every peer relationship generates constructive conflicts and that some of them give rise to asymmetrical relationships. The conclusions are relevant for developmental psychologists: In those conversations dominated by expectations originated in gender SR, there is little room for the explicit display of cognitive conflicts; on the contrary, where micro conversations avoid expectations related to gender, socio cognitive conflicts are more active and give rise to reflection processes.

Despite their progresses, Duveen and his colleagues did not manage to exhaustively elucidate the dynamics of the internalization of SR, which would mean – from a developmental psychologist’s point of view – placing oneself in the subjects’ point of view; a shortcoming Duveen cannot be criticized for. Some questions remain: What degree of freedom has an individual for appropriating SR? How do SR have a bearing on the actions performed by individuals to resolve problems in everyday life?

In all, these reviewed empirical studies are the “realization” of a relational epistemic framework that dialectically integrates opposite epistemological positions, in sharp contrast
with Durkheim’s dualist solution. The dialectic approach is similar to Piaget’s view of the interactions between the individual and society, with the differences mentioned; the conception of culture that made it possible to formulate Vygotsky’s theory of internalization can also be compared with this approach (Castorina and Baquero, 2005). Duveen formulated a view of the interaction between status and epistemic authorities that involves children’s intellectual activity. The passage from a judgment dominated by social representations (in this case, gender) to an autonomous resolution of the moral problem is made possible by such a conflict between authorities. In addition, SR are conventions that allow individuals to handle interactions concerning a moral matter. Thanks to the social identity that expresses them, SR “constrain” moral elaboration, providing individual arguments with a direction. In turn, the formation of those identities is influenced by the development of individual capacities. In addition, SR influence arguments that take place in microgenetic social exchanges, conditioning the production of cognitive conflicts, while development, in turn, conditions that influence.

THE LEGACY

What are Duveen’s contributions to the relation between the TSR and DP, according to what has been claimed in this article?

There is no doubt that, among other important contributions, we must include his attack at the dualism present in Durkheim’s work (Duveen, 2001), as well as his criticism of the dissociation between social transmission and individual activity in the work of some of his TSR colleagues and in the DP of social knowledge, even in the studies on SR that separated them artificially from the social practices they make intelligible (Duveen, 1994b). Moreover, Duveen strongly defended the relevance of the interrelations between constructive activity and social practices of authority and cooperation, between the construction of the social subject and the object in the genesis of SR, as well as between cognitive restrictions and the ontogenesis of social identity. But the most outstanding contribution is the “realization” of the dialectical framework in the coordination of the components of research situations and, specifically, in the analysis of the results.
In his studies, the dialectical perspective – so frequently used to conceal the vagueness of the researchers’ concepts once dualism has been rejected – becomes a genuine search for units of analysis that incorporate precisely the conflicts and the interpenetration of restrictions and construction, according to the problem under study. His credibility derives from his strict analysis of the intertwined components of a situation and of the indirect test of the employed procedures. In this way, Duveen managed to clarify the lattice existing between SR and individuals as formulated by the TSR; the emergence of SR of school social practices, and how they become intelligible through the analysis of meanings, in ethnographic studies (Duveen and Lloyd, 1993; Duveen, 1994b); the gender identities that constrain the changes in boys and girls’ moral arguments, identities that do not cancel, but imply the individual constructive activity (Leman and Duveen, 1999); or the different ways children assume the possibilities of their social identity in different circumstances (Duveen, 1994a).

Now, as an auctor, his rich interpretation of the great thinkers, as well as his productive ideas about the ontogenesis of SR, should be picked up with new spirits by developmental psychologists proposing new interdisciplinary research projects guided by their own questions. I am referring to a DP that does not reduce its “problem space” to explanations centered only on an intraindividual level (Wagner, 1992). It is necessary for social psychologists to explicitly negotiate a dialectical epistemic framework with the heirs of constructivist and Vygotskian thinking. In this sense, a recent group of studies on genetic psychology “revisited” link constructivism to social psychology and social science, while placing individual knowledge in the context of social practices. For this approach, SR and institutional actions that have children as their objects, tend to channel children’s ideas about school authority (Castorina and Lenzi, 2000), their notions about the right to intimacy (Horn and Castorina, 2007), and the ideology of the Belief in a Just World, often limiting children and adolescents’ arguments about justice (Barreiro, 2008). In fact, the pursuit of studies aimed at elucidating the individuation process in the TSR, which Duveen left incomplete, may require a collaborative work with DP studies that adopt children’s point of view, but in the context of social practices.

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