Social Psychology and Developmental Psychology: Conversation or Collaboration?
Commentary on J. A. Castorina, “The Ontogenesis of Social Representations: A Dialectic Perspective”

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It is rare, for this author at least, to find that the experience of reading a manuscript is as much an emotional journey as it is an intellectual journey. Yet as I read José Castorina’s article, I began to remember my many conversations with Gerard; conversations where Gerard always generously shared his vast knowledge of the field and where one always left wanting to return again, five minutes later, to continue the debate. The sensitivity with which Castorina has captured the essence (and even tenor) of Gerard’s thinking is striking. Castorina’s article impresses partly because it combines the best of theoretical analysis with a warm attention to the details and aims of Gerard’s work. However, and again in a resoundingly “Duveenian” tradition, the article is in no way lazy or uncritical. Castorina rightly points to persistent tensions and sources of instability in Gerard’s work and to the conflicts that almost inevitably follow from the ambitious attempt to marry social and developmental psychology. Alongside the tremendous personal loss of Gerard’s early death, there is the loss to psychology. His attempt to articulate an account of the development of social representations, and (perhaps) simultaneously to cross-fertilise the contributions of social and developmental psychology, remains incomplete. Yet in Castorina’s article I see that this project has a promising, even exciting, future!
In this commentary I do not intend to revisit every detail of Castorina’s discussion and exposition around Gerard’s work. As I have indicated, I agree with the thrust of his critique which focuses on how Gerard’s contribution consisted in identifying important problems as much as in seeking to solve them. Instead, I wish to use this opportunity to explore the broader contribution of Gerard’s work to social and developmental psychology, and in particular to pay some closer attention to the ways in which Gerard’s identity (and perhaps we could say “socialisation”) as a developmental psychologist influenced and informed his work in social psychology and in particular in his work on social representations. I do this in full recognition that Gerard’s identity was as much “social psychologist” as it was “developmental psychologist” – in fact, I am sure he would have viewed this distinction as, in an intellectual sense, a category error. Gerard’s distinctive contribution to work on social representations was greatly informed by his readings of developmental theorists and his intuitive sensitivities to developmental issues. Lastly, I want to speak to Castorina’s concluding remarks concerning the legacy of Gerard’s research.

At this point, I ought to give a little context to the title of this commentary: it is drawn from, or maybe inspired by, Moscovici’s seminal reflection on Gerard’s and Barbara Lloyd’s edited volume on the development of social representations (Moscovici, 1990). Castorina rightly notes that both Gerard and Moscovici felt that Vygotsky’s socio-cultural approach (e.g., Vygotsky, 1928/1962) was, “too good to be true,” because it suggested too neat a transmission of social and cultural norms from adult to child. All too often, however, social psychologists have (mis)appropriated Vygotsky’s theory and have “parked” developmental issues in order to pursue rather narrow social psychological objectives. As Duveen, Moscovici and now Castorina remind us, we ignore these developmental issues at our peril: to reduce “socialisation” to a simple process is clearly an error, just as a common error in developmental psychology is to study developmental processes from a fundamentally asocial perspective. Thus, Castorina is surely right to note that developmental psychology needs to, “...adopt children’s point of view, but in the context of social practices”. And he is right, too, to suggest that this requires collaboration rather than mere conversation because the aims of developmental and social psychology are inevitably bound up together (Duveen, 1997).

Debates between supporters of Vygotskian and Piagetian (or, as Castorina labels, “constructivist”) approaches lay at the heart of debates in late twentieth century developmental psychology (see, Tryphon & Vonèche, 1996, for chapters discussing the nuances of this debate) and clearly informed much of Gerard’s thinking. However, even modern socio-cultural theorists might argue that there are strong elements of constructivism...
in Vygotskian accounts of learning and internalisation of social knowledge (see Rogoff, 1990). Indeed, there is a great deal of concordance between the two theorists (see, Piaget, 1962) even if the theorists differ in their underlying epistemological conceptions (Leman, 1998).

In this respect a particularly informative distinction centres around the role of egocentric speech (or private speech) for each theorist. Egocentric speech refers to speech for “oneself” (i.e., without regard for an audience): it might include monologue (the child privately but audibly narrates an activity that she is undertaking) or collective monologue (a sort of parallel speech where children take turns in a “proto-conversation” without regard for semantic features of one another’s contribution, see Piaget, 1923). For Vygotsky, egocentric speech serves a developmental purpose as the child uses it to begin the process of internalising language and social understanding. Thus neo-Vygotskian researchers often point to how children begin by reading out loud (even on their own), then whisper, the read silently, first with then without lip movements (e.g., Berk, 1999). In contrast, for Piaget, egocentric speech was a consequence of egocentric cognition – the inability to appreciate that others’ perspectives differed from one’s own. Once children could engage in truly intersubjective interactions, they could meaningfully collaborate and construct knowledge together. Decentred speech made the co-construction of knowledge possible.

The distinct role of egocentric speech in each theory serves, arguably, as a useful proxy for understanding the theorists’ differing views on developmental process and on the nature of social knowledge. And this important problem for developmental theorists – how do children come to at once learn and also to participate in social life – lies at the centre of Gerard’s contribution to work on social representations. For if social representations arise from social activity, how does the child come to be a competent participant in this activity both in terms of the full (adult) membership of the group and in terms of the knowledge and understanding of the representation? Here we can see why the Theory of Social Representations (TSR) held such appeal to Gerard: by elaborating the objectification of social representations (Moscovici, 1981) and by emphasising how social representations serve to, “familiarise us with the strange, according to the categories of our culture” (Moscovici, 1988, p.211), Moscovici demonstrates a sensitivity to the sorts of deeper, conceptual and epistemological problems that have been given less attention in some other, contemporary social psychological theories. A core concern with the genesis of knowledge chimes with central developmental issues.
On this latter point I would disagree with Castorina’s characterisation of Gerard’s contribution, if this is implied, as pointing to developmental process as one of individuation. This interpretation is, perhaps, too close to a “Vygotskian” view of development as internalisation. To be sure, the ontogenesis of social representations will involve components of individual change and I share the desire to see social representations research tackling questions of individual change more frequently and with greater gusto than has hitherto been the case. Yet to cast the individual as a unit of theoretical interest is a mistake: the individual is often, necessarily an empirical focus but development is, always, a social process (Duveen, 1997).

The desire to expound a socio-cognitive account of the development of social knowledge led to my collaboration with Gerard. This collaboration focussed, empirically, on communication and the role of gender in the development of moral reasoning. Addressing this social aspect of Piaget’s work led us to explore how children engage in and master social relations, whilst keeping in mind the important cognitive aspects of moral reasoning (e.g., Kohlberg, 1976) and the long-standing tension between cultural “relativism” on the one hand and moral objectivism on the other (e.g., Shweder, 1990). Actually we never sought to tackle the latter, large, cross-cultural questions: but in exploring how gender influenced the communication of moral ideas between children we had one eye to Carol Gilligan’s work on separate male and female “moralities” of justice and care respectively (Gilligan, 1982) and the representations they were thought to sustain.

Our initial studies of moral reasoning suggested that gender may serve to obstruct communication (e.g., Leman, 2002; Leman & Duveen, 1999). Yet subsequent research has pointed to uncertainty over whether these obstructions have lasting effects on children’s learning and development. It is worth noting that Gilligan’s proposed gender distinction between a morality of justice and an ethic of care has not been borne out by empirical research (e.g., Jaffee & Hyde, 2000). Moreover, whilst there are undoubtedly different male and female conversational (behavioural) styles that boys and girls reproduce from a very young age (Leaper & Smith, 2004), children appear to be very successful at employing “workarounds” to the obstacles that these styles may present to communication in cross gender (Leman, Ahmed & Ozarow, 2005; Leman & Björnberg, 2010) and inter-ethnic communication (Leman, Macedo, Bluschke, Hudson, Rawlings, & Wright, in press). In short, girls and boys overcome communicative differences to solve problems and learn together.
Interestingly, in a impressive series of collaborations Gerard and Charis Psaltis (Duveen & Psaltis, 2008; Psaltis & Duveen, 2006, 2007) find more enduring effects of gender on development in studies of conservation skill – the Piagetian finding that young children fail to understand that certain properties of objects such as quantity, volume and mass, remain unchanged despite changes in superficial appearance. These domain differences (i.e., between findings in moral and cognitive tasks respectively), intersecting with gender and development in this way, highlight again the complex relationships between identity and knowledge. The findings reinforce the observation that social representations are anything but static or “passive”, but instead are the dynamic products of a process of social construction. The representation itself exerts a force.

A final, important, and distinctive feature of Piaget’s account of moral development (Piaget, 1932) was the importance of autonomy in moral thinking for Piaget. Piaget attacked Durkheim’s notion of moral learning as presenting us with only one type of morality – a hegemonic set of rules passed down from “on high” and justified by Society (heteronomous morality). Piaget argued that older children and adults do not make moral judgments in this way, they reason in terms of autonomy in judgment. Thus the moral contract holds across society because we all sign up to it (through “mutual respect”) and not because we show deference to Society’s rules (“unilateral respect”). Thus achieving autonomous moral reasoning is at once a developmental achievement, and a social and a cognitive one. With its attack on Durkheim’s account, the focus on social relations in development, and the idea of autonomous moral knowledge, my feeling is that Moral Judgment of the Child was the Piagetian work that Gerard felt held most promise for building a theory of the development of social representations. Again, this work remains incomplete but there is a great deal to be gained by a careful study of social representations of morality and their causes and antecedents.

Castorina’s article makes clear the tensions that Gerard sought to address, and the extent of his contribution to research across social and developmental psychology. Gerard’s contribution here is huge and, I feel sure, will grow with time as it becomes clear how far his ideas and approaches can help to solve problems we know, and may yet encounter. There is one other, more subtle contribution that we should not ignore. By seeking to explore these issues of theory, and with a genuine interest in ideas (sometimes even for their own sake), Gerard at times stood apart from much mainstream psychology in UK. His unique combination of a warm, yet incisive intellect, inspired too many young researchers to mention here. There can be little doubt that his ideas will endure and exert a continued
influence on the field for many years to come. Perhaps, then, the time is ripe to pursue this collaboration, and not just a conversation, between developmental psychology and social psychology with a renewed vigour. Gerard’s work offers us a route map for this joint work. Castorina’s compelling and convincing paper suggests the prospects for future research here are extremely bright.

REFERENCES


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